Sir, the Communicable Diseases Agency (CDA) Bill will establish a body to oversee communicable diseases. It was one of the key recommendations of the government’s COVID-19 White Paper, and its formation was already alluded to in Minister Ong’s speech during the related debate.[1] I do not propose to revisit the arguments that were made by the Workers’ Party then, but let me state at the outset that we support the Bill. We will nevertheless offer three suggestions, on the scope and objectives of the new institution, as it commences its service to Singapore.
The CDA should have a broad mandate to address emergencies
First, we believe that the emergency preparedness and response mandate of the CDA has to be sufficiently broad. This means that the institution should not simply be focused on the most stereotypical public health emergency, which has to do with disease outbreaks like epidemics and pandemics.
The CDA should also regard disaster management as a key part of its scenario planning parameters. While Singapore, thankfully, rarely encounters the standard range of natural disasters—such as earthquakes, tsunamis, and wildfires—flooding remains common, in spite of advances in our water management infrastructure. And while communicable water-borne diseases, such as cholera, are very rare in modern Singapore, cases do sporadically arise, as they did in 2009.[2] By a similar token, man-made disasters—such as chemical or (in future) radiological incidents—would have associated disease transmission risks, and have to be planned for.
Perhaps more crucially, the CDA should also consider the implications of bioterrorist threats, such as smallpox or engineered virus strains. While Mindef or the MHA would, undoubtedly, be tasked with how best to counter such attacks, the management of the aftermath of a bioweapons outbreak would, logically, fall under the scope of the CDA.
The CDA should play a role in addressing ongoing communicable diseases
But the CDA should not confine its mandate to emergencies alone. Many communicable diseases are ongoing and possibly seasonal, such as dengue or influenza. Their routine nature should not diminish their risks. After all, recorded dengue cases, islandwide, amounted to 13,564 in 2024,[3] and in 2009, an outbreak of the H1N1 strain led to an estimated 270,000 infections, and 18 deaths.[4]
This would mean enfolding seemingly-mundane tasks, like the provision of educational and informational advisories on communicable disease prevention, into the priorities for the new agency. The CDA should be leading public informational campaigns ranging from annual flu shots to prevention strategies for HIV.
Indeed, it is sometimes the nonclinical aspects of such diseases—such as ensuring that the undisrupted supply chain of masks and other critical medical supplies, or regulating appropriate safeguards for close-quarter living spaces (an acknowledged oversight in our COVID-19 response)—that may be the most critical.
We understand, of course, that many of these roles currently fall to different agencies and ministries. Dengue and Zika, for example, are overseen by the National Environment Agency, while the various strains of influenza are currently monitored directly by MOH. MTI would almost inevitably be involved in supply-chain matters, and foreign-worker dormitories currently fall under the purview of MOM. And research funding for vaccine research would be administered by the NRF.
Perhaps the Minister would be willing to explain how the different roles would be reallocated, going forward, if indeed the new CDA will have front-line oversight of all communicable diseases. And if, indeed, the new agency will draw on expertise across the breadth of government functions, should Clauses 51–53 of the Bill—which currently limits employee transfers to MOH and HPS—be more general?
The CDA must ensure communication and coordination in all matters related to communicable diseases
The mixed tapestry of interlinked government agencies will mean a whole-of-government effort. And this, in turn, will mean the need to establish constant channels of communication and coordination, insofar as infectious diseases are concerned. The new CDA must be proactive in this process.
Most evidently, this would be within Singapore, both between government bodies, but also with allied institutions, such as clinics and hospitals, or university research centers. It would also entail coordinating the process of international knowledge and information exchange—an important objective the government itself acknowledges—so that we do not reinvent the wheel or go down unproductive paths in our scientific and policy decisions.
One common complaint during the COVID pandemic was how information and guidance from MOH seemed to change by the week, and releases were often confusing. While we appreciate that the management of ever-evolving diseases is necessarily dynamic, it should not preclude the deployment of simple and reliable communication strategies.
After all, successful communication and coordination was, directly or indirectly, a theme for 4 of the 7 main lessons from the COVID-19 White Paper.[5] With recent lapses in interagency communication surrounding the failed Allianz-Income deal, multiple MRT service disruptions, and the Bizfile NRIC leak, it behooves us to ensure that similar breakdowns do not recur in times of crisis.
[1] Hansard (2023) 95(94): Mar 21.
[2] National Centre for Infectious Diseases (2025), Cholera, Singapore: NCID.
[3] NEA (2025), Dengue Cases, Singapore: National Environment Agency.
[4] Cutter, J.L., L.W. Ang, F.Y.L. Lai, H. Subramony, S. Ma & L. James (2010), “Outbreak of Pandemic Influenza A (H1N1-2009) in Singapore, May to September 2009,” Annals of the Academy of Medicine Singapore39(4): 273–82.
[5] These are: Improving partnerships across the public, people, and private sectors; strengthen public health expertise and organizational capacity (especially on plugging into international technical and surveillance networks); improve forward planning capabilities and structures (especially in appointing a dedicated forward planning team); and maintaining clear and transparent public communication. See PMO (2023), White Paper on Singapore’s Response to COVID-19: Lessons for the Next Pandemic, Singapore: Prime Minister’s Office.
